AWS ALB mTLS Device Certificate POC — Step-by-Step SOP
On this page
- 1. Target Architecture
- 2. Prerequisites
- 3. Create the POC Root CA on Mac
- 4. Create Client Certificate Extensions
- 5. Verify Windows TPM
- 6. Initial Client Certificate Approach — IMPORTANT CORRECTION
- 7. Corrected Approach — User Certificate Store + TPM
- 8. Sign Windows CSR on Mac
- 9. Install Signed Certificate on Windows
- 10. Verify Certificate Store
- 11. Verify TPM and Non-Exportable Private Key
- 12. Configure AWS S3 for Trust Store
- 13. Create AWS ALB Trust Store
- 14. Enable mTLS on ALB HTTPS Listener
- 15. Verify AWS Listener After Saving
- 16. Browser Certificate Verification
- 17. Authorized Device Test
- 18. Unauthorized Device Test
- 19. Security Validation
- 20. Important Lessons / Corrections From the POC
- 21. Troubleshooting
- 22. Operational Certificate Lifecycle
- 23. Production Recommendations
- 24. Final POC Checklist
- 25. POC Conclusion
Purpose: Restrict access to an ERP application so that only authorized Windows devices with a valid client certificate can establish HTTPS access through an AWS Application Load Balancer (ALB).
POC URL: https://apps.ditos.io
ALB: hello-world-alb
HTTPS Listener: 443
Target Group: hello-world-tg
AWS Region: ap-south-1
Important: This SOP records the actual POC journey, including an initial approach that did not work with Chrome and the corrected approach. Do not skip the correction notes.
1. Target Architecture
Authorized Windows Laptop
|
| HTTPS + Client Certificate
| TPM-backed private key
v
AWS Application Load Balancer
|
| mTLS verification
| Trust Store -> Ditos ERP POC Root CA
v
ERP Target Group
|
v
ERP Application
|
| Normal ERP username/password
v
Authenticated User
Security layers
- TLS server authentication —
apps.ditos.ioserver certificate. - Device authentication — AWS ALB verifies the Windows client certificate.
- User authentication — ERP still requires normal username/password.
- The client private key is generated using Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider and is not exportable.
2. Prerequisites
Mac / CA administration machine
- macOS
- OpenSSL 3.x
- Terminal access
- Secure storage for the CA private key
Windows authorized device
- Windows 10/11
- TPM 2.0 available and ready
- Administrator PowerShell access
- Chrome or Edge
- Device name:
DITOS-PC-001
AWS
- Existing Application Load Balancer
- Existing HTTPS listener on port 443
- Existing server certificate for
apps.ditos.io - Permission to create S3 bucket, trust store and modify ALB listener
3. Create the POC Root CA on Mac
Create the working directory:
mkdir -p ~/Documents/SSLBlockTest/{ca,client,config}
cd ~/Documents/SSLBlockTest
Verify OpenSSL:
openssl version
Example:
OpenSSL 3.6.4
3.1 Generate Root CA private key
The Root CA private key must remain on the secure CA/admin machine.
Example:
openssl genrsa -aes256 -out ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.key 4096
Protect the passphrase.
Never upload the Root CA private key to AWS S3 or to the Windows client.
3.2 Create Root CA certificate
Example:
openssl req -x509 -new -sha256 \
-key ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.key \
-out ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.crt \
-days 3650 \
-subj "/C=IN/ST=Karnataka/L=Bengaluru/O=Ditos/OU=IT/CN=Ditos ERP POC Root CA"
Verify:
openssl x509 -in ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.crt -noout -subject -issuer -dates
The Root CA should show:
CA:TRUE
4. Create Client Certificate Extensions
Create:
~/Documents/SSLBlockTest/config/client-ext.cnf
Contents:
basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE
keyUsage=critical,digitalSignature
extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid,issuer
The important setting is:
extendedKeyUsage=clientAuth
This makes the certificate suitable for TLS client authentication.
5. Verify Windows TPM
On DITOS-PC-001, open Administrator PowerShell.
Run:
Get-Tpm
Expected important values:
TpmPresent : True
TpmReady : True
TpmEnabled : True
If TPM is not present/ready, stop and resolve the TPM issue before continuing.
6. Initial Client Certificate Approach — IMPORTANT CORRECTION
6.1 Initial approach
The first certificate was generated using a Windows machine key with:
MachineKeySet = TRUE
ProviderName = "Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider"
Exportable = FALSE
This created a certificate for:
CN=DITOS-PC-001
and it was successfully signed by the POC Root CA.
The certificate was installed in:
Cert:\LocalMachine\My
and verification showed:
Provider = Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider
Private key is NOT exportable
HasPrivateKey = True
Why this was not sufficient
Although the certificate was correctly TPM-backed, Chrome did not use this certificate for the browser client-authentication flow.
Chrome showed a different client certificate and the request to:
https://apps.ditos.io
resulted in:
ERR_CONNECTION_RESET
Evidence from testing
Chrome’s certificate viewer showed a certificate with:
CN=4a1a0212-5e58-4891-8950-bdce3040dfe7
instead of:
CN=DITOS-PC-001
Therefore, do not assume that a machine-store certificate being TPM-backed automatically means Chrome will select it for browser mTLS.
7. Corrected Approach — User Certificate Store + TPM
For the browser POC, the corrected approach was to generate the TPM-backed private key in the current user’s certificate context.
The private key remains:
- TPM-backed
- non-exportable
- managed by Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider
7.1 Create Windows CSR configuration
On Windows:
@"
[Version]
Signature="$Windows NT$"
[NewRequest]
Subject = "CN=DITOS-PC-001, O=Ditos, OU=ERP Devices, L=Bengaluru, ST=Karnataka, C=IN"
KeyLength = 2048
KeyAlgorithm = RSA
HashAlgorithm = SHA256
KeyUsage = 0x80
ProviderName = "Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider"
ProviderType = 0
RequestType = PKCS10
Exportable = FALSE
[Extensions]
2.5.29.37 = "{text}1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2"
"@ | Out-File -Encoding ascii C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.inf
Generate CSR:
certreq -new C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.inf C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.csr
Verify:
certutil -dump C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.csr
Confirm:
Subject: CN=DITOS-PC-001
Public Key Length: 2048 bits
Enhanced Key Usage:
Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
Provider = Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider
8. Sign Windows CSR on Mac
Copy:
C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.csr
to:
~/Documents/SSLBlockTest/client/PC-001-user.csr
On Mac:
cd ~/Documents/SSLBlockTest
Sign:
openssl x509 -req \
-in client/PC-001-user.csr \
-CA ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.crt \
-CAkey ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.key \
-CAcreateserial \
-out client/PC-001-user.crt \
-days 365 \
-sha256 \
-extfile config/client-ext.cnf
Verify:
openssl verify \
-CAfile ca/ditos-erp-root-ca.crt \
client/PC-001-user.crt
Expected:
client/PC-001-user.crt: OK
9. Install Signed Certificate on Windows
Copy only:
PC-001-user.crt
to:
C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.crt
Do not copy a private key.
The private key must remain on the Windows device/TPM.
Install:
certreq -accept C:\DitosMTLS\PC-001-user.crt
Record the returned thumbprint.
In the completed POC the thumbprint was:
0D87688BF26E15388D1A720E9C48F339EF0D0947
10. Verify Certificate Store
Check the current user’s certificate store:
Get-ChildItem Cert:\CurrentUser\My |
Where-Object {$_.Thumbprint -eq "0D87688BF26E15388D1A720E9C48F339EF0D0947"} |
Format-List Subject,Thumbprint,HasPrivateKey
Expected:
Subject : CN=DITOS-PC-001, ...
Thumbprint : 0D87688BF26E15388D1A720E9C48F339EF0D0947
HasPrivateKey : True
Check the machine store:
Get-ChildItem Cert:\LocalMachine\My |
Where-Object {$_.Thumbprint -eq "0D87688BF26E15388D1A720E9C48F339EF0D0947"} |
Format-List Subject,Thumbprint,HasPrivateKey
For this corrected browser POC, the certificate should be in:
Cert:\CurrentUser\My
11. Verify TPM and Non-Exportable Private Key
Run:
certutil -user -store My 0D87688BF26E15388D1A720E9C48F339EF0D0947
The completed POC showed:
Provider = Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider
Private key is NOT exportable
Encryption test passed
These are critical checks.
Required security properties
| Property | Expected |
|---|---|
| Certificate subject | CN=DITOS-PC-001 |
| Provider | Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider |
| Private key | Present |
| Exportable | No |
| Key algorithm | RSA |
| Key length | 2048 |
| EKU | Client Authentication |
| Certificate issuer | Ditos ERP POC Root CA |
12. Configure AWS S3 for Trust Store
Create a private S3 bucket, for example:
ditos-erp-mtls-poc-9835
Upload only:
ditos-erp-root-ca.crt
Do not upload:
ditos-erp-root-ca.key
Keep S3 public access blocked.
13. Create AWS ALB Trust Store
In AWS:
EC2
→ Load Balancers
→ Trust Stores
→ Create trust store
Name:
ditos-erp-poc-trust-store
Use the Root CA certificate bundle containing:
ditos-erp-root-ca.crt
Expected status:
Active
The completed POC showed:
CA certificates in bundle: 1
Total revoked certs: 0
14. Enable mTLS on ALB HTTPS Listener
Navigate:
EC2
→ Load Balancers
→ hello-world-alb
→ HTTPS:443 listener
→ Security
→ Edit secure listener settings
Configure:
Client certificate handling
Mutual authentication (mTLS): ON
Mode
Verify with trust store
Trust store
ditos-erp-poc-trust-store
Expired client certificate handling
Select:
Don't allow expired client certificates
Advertise trust store CA subject names
For the POC:
ON
Do not change
Keep the existing server certificate:
apps.ditos.io
Do not modify the HTTP listener 80 unless specifically required.
Save the listener configuration.
15. Verify AWS Listener After Saving
The ALB listener security page should show:
Mutual authentication (mTLS)
Verify with trust store
Trust store:
ditos-erp-poc-trust-store
Trust store association status:
Active
Advanced settings:
Expired client certificates:
Don't allow expired client certificates
Advertise trust store CA subject names:
On
16. Browser Certificate Verification
On the authorized Windows laptop, open Chrome:
chrome://certificate-manager/clientcertificates
Under:
Your certificates
Chrome should be able to access certificates imported from Windows.
The corrected certificate should correspond to:
DITOS-PC-001
If Chrome displays a completely different certificate, investigate before continuing.
17. Authorized Device Test
On DITOS-PC-001:
https://apps.ditos.io
Chrome should request/select the client certificate.
Select:
DITOS-PC-001
After successful TLS/mTLS authentication, the ERP website should open.
If the ERP then asks for its normal username/password, that is expected.
Final authentication flow
Device certificate
↓
AWS ALB mTLS verification
↓
HTTPS connection accepted
↓
ERP application
↓
ERP username/password
↓
User authenticated
18. Unauthorized Device Test
Use a second Windows laptop that does not have the authorized client certificate/private key.
Open:
https://apps.ditos.io
Do not install the client certificate.
Expected result:
Access denied / TLS client certificate error / connection reset
The exact browser error can vary.
The important requirement is:
The unauthorized laptop must not establish a successful HTTPS session with the ERP through the ALB.
19. Security Validation
The POC is considered successful when all of the following are true:
- Authorized laptop has TPM.
- Client private key generated using Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider.
- Client private key is non-exportable.
- Client certificate has Client Authentication EKU.
- Client certificate is signed by the trusted Root CA.
- Root CA certificate is in the ALB trust store.
- ALB HTTPS listener uses mTLS Verify mode.
- Trust store association is Active.
- Authorized laptop can access
apps.ditos.io. - Unauthorized laptop without client certificate is blocked.
- ERP username/password remains required after mTLS.
20. Important Lessons / Corrections From the POC
Correction 1 — Machine certificate vs browser certificate store
Initial attempt
Certificate was installed in:
Cert:\LocalMachine\My
It was correctly TPM-backed:
Provider = Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider
Private key is NOT exportable
However, Chrome did not use that certificate for the browser client-authentication flow.
Corrected approach
The client certificate was generated with the TPM-backed key and installed in:
Cert:\CurrentUser\My
with:
HasPrivateKey = True
Chrome could then select the appropriate client certificate.
Correction 2 — Never copy the private key to the client
The Mac CA signs the CSR but does not receive the Windows private key.
The correct flow is:
Windows TPM
|
| generates private key
|
+--> CSR
|
v
Mac CA
|
| signs CSR
v
Client CRT
|
v
Windows
|
+--> associates certificate with existing TPM key
Never do:
Windows private key → Mac
and never do:
CA private key → Windows
Correction 3 — Do not use a Mac-generated client private key for the final Windows POC
An earlier Mac-generated client key/certificate existed:
DITOS-PC-001.key
DITOS-PC-001.csr
DITOS-PC-001.crt
These were not used for the final TPM-backed Windows browser authentication.
The final path uses:
PC-001-user.csr
PC-001-user.crt
with the private key generated on Windows using:
Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider
21. Troubleshooting
Browser shows ERR_CONNECTION_RESET
First check:
- Is mTLS enabled on the ALB?
- Is the trust store association Active?
- Is the client certificate trusted by the ALB trust store?
- Does Chrome see the correct client certificate?
- Does the certificate have Client Authentication EKU?
- Does the certificate have an associated private key?
- Is the private key accessible through Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider?
Do not immediately change the ALB configuration.
Chrome shows an unexpected certificate
If Chrome shows a certificate with an unrelated CN, for example:
CN=4a1a0212-5e58-4891-8950-bdce3040dfe7
instead of:
CN=DITOS-PC-001
inspect:
chrome://certificate-manager/clientcertificates
and verify the Windows certificate store.
Certificate has HasPrivateKey = False
The certificate cannot perform client authentication.
Check:
Get-ChildItem Cert:\CurrentUser\My |
Where-Object {$_.Thumbprint -eq "<THUMBPRINT>"} |
Format-List Subject,Thumbprint,HasPrivateKey
Expected:
HasPrivateKey : True
Certificate is in LocalMachine but Chrome does not use it
This was encountered during the POC.
For the browser POC, use the corrected current-user TPM certificate approach and verify:
Cert:\CurrentUser\My
22. Operational Certificate Lifecycle
The client certificate in this POC was issued for:
365 days
Before expiration:
- Generate a new CSR on the authorized Windows device.
- Generate the new private key through TPM.
- Sign the CSR using the CA.
- Install the new certificate.
- Verify the new certificate has the TPM-backed private key.
- Test access.
- Revoke/retire the old certificate if the PKI supports revocation.
- Remove old certificates after successful migration.
23. Production Recommendations
This POC uses a locally managed Root CA. For production, consider:
- AWS Private CA or an enterprise PKI.
- HSM/protected CA private keys.
- Automated certificate issuance and renewal.
- Certificate revocation strategy / CRLs.
- Device inventory and certificate-to-device mapping.
- Microsoft Intune / enterprise device management.
- Endpoint compliance controls.
- Monitoring and ALB access logging.
- Certificate expiry alerts.
- Formal certificate rotation process.
Important limitation
A TPM prevents extraction/export of the private key material, but it does not by itself guarantee that a compromised authorized Windows machine cannot use the private key. An attacker with sufficient control of the authorized endpoint may potentially cause the machine to perform cryptographic operations with the key.
For stronger production security, combine mTLS with endpoint management, device compliance and identity controls.
24. Final POC Checklist
| Area | Status |
|---|---|
| Root CA created | Complete |
| Root CA private key protected | Complete |
| Windows TPM verified | Complete |
| Initial machine-store approach tested | Failed for Chrome browser selection |
| Corrected user-store TPM approach | Complete |
| Client CSR generated on Windows | Complete |
| Client CSR signed by CA | Complete |
| Client certificate installed | Complete |
| Client certificate has private key | Complete |
| Microsoft Platform Crypto Provider | Complete |
| Private key non-exportable | Complete |
| AWS S3 CA bundle | Complete |
| AWS ALB trust store | Complete |
| ALB mTLS Verify mode | Complete |
| Trust store association | Active |
| Authorized laptop access | Working |
| Unauthorized laptop blocked | To be tested |
| ERP username/password | To be confirmed after mTLS |
25. POC Conclusion
The corrected implementation successfully demonstrates:
TPM-backed device identity
+
AWS ALB mTLS
+
ERP application authentication
The authorized Windows laptop can access:
https://apps.ditos.io
while the next validation step is to confirm that a second laptop without the authorized client certificate is blocked.
This SOP should be used as the POC baseline, while the production implementation should replace the locally managed CA process with an enterprise-grade PKI/certificate lifecycle.